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Abstract 
This article examines the initiatives of European Union in the field of the democracy promotion from a historical 
and political perspective. The analysis covers: the theoretical framework and the dilemmas of the European 
governance; the EU democracy promotion strategies in post-communist countries; the debates over the liberal 
reforms and the national interest. Moreover, we have to note that EU has developed a “fairly hierarchical” 
political system. In the light of the 2009 European Parliament, particular attention has been devoted to the 
discussions for improving the European democracy. Due to the staging of the democratic process, the Union is a 
project in evolution that clearly has not reached its final framework. 
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Theoretical perspectives  
 
 For much of the past twenty years analysts and academics have debated whether the 
European Union suffers from a “crisis of identity” combined with a “democratic deficit”. 
Critics contend that the structure and functionality of the European institutions, in particular 
the visible weakness of the European Parliament and the lack of enthusiasm and support for 
the European project among the European citizens1 have always been present at the European 
level. In the light of the 2009 European Parliament, particular attention has also been devoted 
to the discussions for improving the European democracy. Due to the staging of the 
democratic process, “the Union is a project in evolution that clearly has not reached its finalité 
or telos yet”2. Furthermore, in this paper I explore the attractiveness of EU membership and 
institutional preconditions attached to the political process of accession. After having 
examined the implications of the reform of the institutional framework, the study explores the 
EU democracy promotion using the recent theories and concepts regarding the effectiveness 
of the European political accession process.  
In recent years the comparative studies on the European democracy promotion process 
approched a two-level game. Moreover, William Phelan argues European politics is 
undertaken by national governments who strategize at the national and international levels3. 
Consequently, the recent litterature on EU democracy promotion concurs on a number of 
diffrent variables regarding the impact of EU accession conditions.  
Above all, in this perspective, the studies design  the relevance of EU’s initiatives 
focused on the domestic condition of democratization. Second, as a consequence, in the 
democratization process, we have the studies take into account the internal obstacles in the 
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transition process. They demonstrate that “with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 
January 2007, the Fifth Enlargement of the EU has come to a close. Whereas the Western 
Balkans and Turkey continue to have a membership perspective, the EU has devised the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for the remaining countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Mediterranean as an alternative to accession”4. 
 
From liberal reforms to national interest 
 
 Most current debate about the European democratic deficit equates democracy 
promotion with national political conditionality and liberal political norms. Jan Zielonka 
addresses a different aspect of this problem: “Cynics often describe the recent history of 
Central and Eastern Europe in terms of moving from one union to another. The former is of 
course the Soviet Union and the latter the European (EU). This seems quite unfair because the 
latter is a symbol of liberty and democracy while the former was about one-party rule if not 
oppression”5. In using historical conditionality, the author sets the adoption of the European 
Union democratic rules and practices as conditions that the former communist countries have 
to fulfill in order to receive the European integration. Moreover, Zielonka’s study shows that 
the EU political system is “fairly hierarchical” and it still proves to be a strong factor in the 
process of democratization. Moreover, the system is “shared and dispersed among various 
governmental centers”6.  
Adrian Vatter and Julian Bernauer argue there are different ways of looking at these 
aspects. In the light of Lijphart’s comparative study on the patterns of democracy in 36 
countries, the study applies a theoretically broader version to the European countries7. On the 
other hand, however, this research focus addresses the conditional question of how direct 
democracy is incorporated into Lijphart’s model democracy8. By contrast, Vatter and 
Bernauer discuss the results of the analysis including a series of alternative definitions and 
model applications. On the basis of this reasoning, the study develops an innovative 
contribution in comparative political research including forms and models of direct 
democracy “as a full-fledged institutional variable in the analysis of patterns of democracy in 
European countries”9.  
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Defining the democratic input in the European Union 
 
What conclusions can be drawn if we sum up all Zielonka’s arguments? In our view, 
one of the most important findings is that the multilevel democratic representation is 
warranted for several reasons: one directly through the European Parliament and other 
indirectly through the national parliaments10. On the one hand, the authors argue that the two 
channels of parliamentary representation are based on various principles of representation.  
 
Table 1. National parliaments and the European Parliament compared11 
 
 National parliament European Parliament 
Level National European 
Total number 27 (15 with two chambers) 1 
Focus on 
legislative 
behavior 
Dedicated to national 
(primary) and EU affairs 
Exclusively dedicated to EU 
affairs; increased legislative 
role in recent years 
Influence over 
EU legislation Indirect Direct 
Executive 
control 
Limited control over 
national governments 
EU has made limited progress 
in terms of “executive 
oversight”12 
Electoral system 
rules Varying Proportional representation 
Distribution of 
seats 
Distributed more or less 
proportionally to electoral 
districts 
Distributed by member state 
with an overweighing of the 
smaller member states 
Term Varying between 4 and 6 years 5 years 
Party 
organization National 
Supranational political groups 
(federations of national 
parties) 
Citizens’ 
perception First-influence Second-influence 
 
Hurrelmann and Debardeleben identify three channels of democratic input in the 
European Union-the European Parliament, national democratic processes surrounding the 
Council of Ministers, and the activity of the civil society in the consultation procedures of the 
European Commission13. Moreover, the authors argue there are also three intelinked 
dilemmas influencing the democratic European process. Most fundamentally, the concept of 
“multilevel governance” highlights a combination of three dilemmas: first “a incongruence in 
territorial space” between the effects of democratic control and the regional authorities14. In 
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addition to the stage of initiation, we have to consider the democracy promotion and EU 
integration as conflicting logics. Kristi Raik stresses the difference between the indirect and 
unintended impact factors of integration15. The effects of these interactions and exchanges of 
factors have been more pervasive than the EU’s policies of the candidate countries16. 
According to Raik’s theory “by penetrating the domestic politics of applicant countries, 
integration into the EU becomes an inseparable part of (re)producing” the democracy of 
candidate countries17.  Second, as a general hypothesis subsuming the different integration 
instruments, Raik proposes a new theoretical and methodological framework of discourse 
analysis.  Although Raik maintains the need for reform emphasizing the link between 
European Union’s institutional instruments and the democracy promotion, others may take the 
view of the lack of satisfaction and knowledge about the European Union as one of the major 
obstacles to fostering greater appreciation and enthusiasm.  
Consistent with these recent researches, Cichowski’s analysis provides a guide for 
understanding the citizen’s attitudes cross-nationally at two levels: first, the study offers 
comparative research on the levels of aggregate support; second, it develops a relevant 
hypothesis based on how EU enlargement “may serve as a proxy for individual attitudes about 
European integration”18. The relationship between political conditions and the citizen’s 
support for national political institutions is derived from the fact that the determinants of 
public support for European integration in member states countries has developed in terms of 
three open models: utilitarian, value, and political economic perception19. Similarly, others 
scholars have focused on the factors influencing the attitudes in member state countries.  
Gabel and Anderson argue “the institutional reforms have altered the EU in the 
direction of representative democracy”20. In addition, past research has dismissed the citizens’ 
preferences viewed as providing the understanding of two fundamental aspects of the 
European integration. First, the question regarding the calls for reforms cannot be filled 
simply by functioning institutions. According to Hooghe Marks, the preferences over the 
European institutional architecture are the product of two functional theories: a. the 
politicization of the EU enlargement; b. furthermore, the citizens’ attitudes have become 
decisive for jurisdictional outcomes21. Second, in contrast, Gabel and Anderson show that the 
development of central institutional reforms “the European electorate may play an 
increasingly important role in structuring political competition”22. Moreover, Mattila and 
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Raunio analyze party-voter congruence on European integration tested with data showing that 
parties are closer to their electorate on the left/right orientation than on the EU dimension23.  
 
Conclusions:   Past strategies, future directions 
 
The foregoing study demonstrates that the European Union is a significant presence in 
the field of democracy promotion policies. Its commitment to focus on the democracy 
promotion compares in quantity terms the “Western perspective” with the US policy, while 
qualitatively the European democracy promotion develops a distinct coordination. However, 
the EU political approach enhances a closer combination of “formal democratic forms” and 
“legal-building elements”24. 
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